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The Influences of the West on the 1993
Russian Constitution
By VICTORIA SCHWARTZ*
I. Introduction
In 1823, Thomas Jefferson wrote "[a] permanent constitution
must be the work of quiet, leisure, much inquiry, and great
deliberation."' Since then, many countries have drafted written
constitutions, and although most participants in that process would
likely describe the experience as full of inquiry and deliberation, few
of their recollections would include "quiet" or "leisure." Certainly,
that was the case with the 1993 Russian Constitution, a product of
chaos and strife that formed as the Soviet Union fell and a new state
emerged from its ruins.
In this article I explore the influences of the West on the 1993
Russian Constitution. After describing how these influences
generally occurred, I examine the influence of Western ideas on
particular portions of the Constitution. Although existing scholarly
works identify Western influences on the Russian Constitution, these
works do not trace how or why particular transplants occurred I
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1. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to A. Coray (Oct. 31, 1823), available at
http://etext.virginia.edu/jefferson/quotations/eff0900.htm.
2. See, e.g., JAMES H. BILLINGTON, RussIA TRANSFORMED 107 (1992) (writing
"[t]he new constitution that was completed for the Russian Republic... was largely
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attempt to fill that gap not as a normative matter, but as a descriptive
matter by identifying particular transplants and explaining how and
why they occurred? Much of the existing legal transplant literature
seeks to explain why transplants succeed4 based on some normative
external notion of success that goes beyond whether a particular
constitution contains borrowed elements By contrast, I limit myself
to describing and explaining the influences on the text of the 1993
Russian Constitution. I do not purport to address whether the
Russian Constitution "succeeded," or whether Western goals for
influencing the Russian Constitution were achieved. Therefore, for
my purposes, our story begins in 1990, with the first efforts to rewrite
the Soviet Constitution, and ends in December 1993, with the
ratification of the Russian Constitution. To the extent that society
believes written constitutions make a difference, and recent efforts to
draft written constitutions in Iraq and Afghanistan suggest it does, it
continues to be important to understand the influences that shape
written constitutions.
Since this article encompasses a single case study, I make no
attempt to formulate a comprehensive theory of constitutional idea
transplants, or legal transplants more generally.6 Without rejecting
American in its inspiration."); Robert Sharlet, Legal Transplants and Political
Mutations: the Reception of Constitutional Law in Russia and the Newly Independent
States, 7 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 59 (1998) (claiming that although the U.S. model was
the early favorite, as time went on the Russian writers turned to the models of
continental Europe).
3. Cf. Ugo Mattei, Efficiency in Legal Transplants: An Essay in Comparative
Law and Economics, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1994) (explaining that there is both
a positive and normative version of Comparative Law and Economics).
4. See Daniel Berkowitz, et al., The Transplant Effect, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 163,
165 (2003) (examining whether legal transplants ever work, and where they do, what
makes the difference); see also generally John M. Owen, IV, The Foreign Imposition
of Domestic Institutions, 56 INT'L ORG. 375 (2002).
5. See Berkowitz, supra note 4, at 165 (pointing out the difference between a
transplanted law on the books and whether the law is effectively enforced). See id. at
183-86 (measuring the success of legal transplants in terms of legality of the recipient
which in turn is measured quantitatively by a complex formula involving the
effectiveness of the judiciary, rule of law, the absence of corruption, the low risk of
contract repudiation and low risk of government); compare THOMAS CAROTHERS,
AIDING DEMOCRACY ABROAD: THE LEARNING CURVE 87 (1999) (assuming that
transplant idea donors have set qualitative objectives for the constitution, such that
success can be measured based on the extent to which the final constitution realizes
these goals).
6. Many attempts at comprehensive theories to explain legal transplants already
exist in the literature. Some of these include Mattei, supra note 3, at 7 (economic
efficiency); R. Sacco, Legal Formats: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law, 39
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existing theories or offering normative conclusions about the
desirability of borrowing, I find that I can often explain the choices
made by the framers of the 1993 Russian Constitution by the
contemporaneous political situation within Russia.
In examining the influence of the West,7 this article uses three
main sources of data. The first source consists of interviews with and
writings by individuals in Russia who were involved in drafting the
1993 Russian Constitution. These interviews, which I conducted
myself, explore the interactions the Russians had with the West, and
the extent to which they believe they were influenced by the West.8
The second source consists of interviews with and writings by
Western individuals who aided the Russians in writing their
constitution.9 Finally, the last and least biased source consists of the
various drafts of the Russian Constitution. By comparing various
drafts at various points in the process, I can track the changes that
occurred along the way, isolate the influences on a particular change,
and substantiate claims regarding a particular influence.
II. Context in Which the Constitution was Written
A. History of the 1993 Russian Constitution
The events surrounding the breakup of the Soviet Union and the
rise of Russia in its ruins have been well documented in historical and
AM. J. COMP. LAW 343, 398 (1991) (prestige); Jonathan M. Miller, A Typology of
Legal Transplants: Using Sociology, Legal History and Argentine Examples to
Explain the Transplant Process, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 839, 842 (2003) (cost saving,
external dictation, entrepreneurial individuals within the recipient country, and
legitimacy generation); Berkowitz, supra note 4, at 167 (the way a country received
its formal law); MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS (1977) (inverse relationship
between transferability and the environmental and social closeness of a given
institution to the local habitat); Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative
Law, 37 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1974) (political factors as obstacles to transplantation).
7. The term "West" is not limited to Western governments. Rather it includes
all influences of Western origin including governments, leaders, NGOs, professionals
and academics, as well as norms, ideas and documents.
8. Although it is possible the sample interviewed was biased because only pro-
Western individuals would be willing to speak to an American, this does not seem to
be a major concern. In obtaining the interviews the author compiled a list of all
individuals known to have played a role in writing the constitution. No individual
actually reached denied an interview, although some individuals could not be located.
9. Admittedly these individuals may have a tendency to exaggerate the role they
played. This is considered in evaluating the information, and tempered by looking at
actual correspondence to ensure a more accurate depiction of the events.
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political literature. Nevertheless, there is no clear consensus
regarding the history of the 1993 Russian Constitution. This account
attempts to reconcile various versions from the literature with
information gathered from interviews. '
The direct history of the 1993 Russian Constitution began on
June 9, 1990, when the First Russian Congress of People's Deputies
("CPD") established a Constitutional Commission to revise the 1978
Brezhnev Constitution inherited from the Soviet Union." Thus, the
original drafting committee was established under the CPD and not
the President, a fact that would become crucial as events unraveled.
Boris Yeltsin, the chairman of the Supreme Soviet, formally led
the Commission. The actual work of drafting the document,
however, was headed by the Executive Secretary of the Commission,
Oleg Rumyantsev, a key player in the story of the Western influences
on the Russian Constitution. The Commission also included
prominent jurists and legal scholars, including several who had been
involved in earlier attempts to draft a new constitution for the USSR,
as well as political scientists, philosophers, historians, and economists.
Geopolitically, the Commission included representatives from each of
Russia's regions plus fourteen elected deputies.12
The Commission chose from its members a working group of
fifteen to twenty people. The working group was relatively
homogenous in terms of its sociopolitical orientation, as its deputies
and lawyers were well known for their democratic stance." It was this
group, rather than the larger Commission, that developed the draft of
the new constitution.
The Commission presented an initial version of the constitution
on October 12, 1990, and with Yeltsin's support, published it in
10. Unless otherwise noted the facts presented here are a compilation of facts as
presented in Victor Sheinis, The Constitution, in BETWEEN DICTATORSHIP AND
DEMOCRACY: RUSSIAN POST-COMMUNIST POLITICAL REFORM 56 (Michael McFaul,
Nikolai Petrov & Andrei Ryabov eds. 2004); Ariel Cohen, Competing Visions:
Russian Constitutional Drafts and Beyond (2.38 Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty
Res. Rep. Radio Broadcast 1993); GORDON B. SMITH, REFORMING THE RUSSIAN
LEGAL SYSTEM 10 (1996); Vera Tolz, Drafting the New Russian Constitution (2.29
Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty Res. Rep. Radio Broadcast 1993); MICHAEL
MCFAUL, RUSSIA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION: POLITICAL CHANGE FROM
GORBACHEV TO PUTIN (2001) [hereinafter, MCFAUL, Unfinished Revolution].
11. SMITH, supra note 10 (The Constitutional Commission was not convened
until early 1992; however the majority of the literature agrees upon this earlier date).
12. The draft constitutions contain a list of contributors making its participants
easy to verify.
13. Sheinis, supra note 10, at 57.
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November of the same year. After the draft's publication, criticism
from communist deputies and the Soviet media caused Yeltsin and his
advisors to remove discussion of the draft from the agenda of the
Second CPD scheduled for the end of 1990. In 1990, the Soviet
Union still technically existed with Gorbachev as its leader. Thus,
Yeltsin's advisors felt if they did not tread carefully, the communists
could regain power and reform attempts could unravel. Therefore,
when the draft constitution faced criticism, Yeltsin elected to
withdraw, rather than confront controversy at a politically difficult
time.
As the Soviet Union collapsed, the Commission produced
numerous additional draft constitutions for consideration by the
CPD, and each time the CPD refused to adopt the draft. By 1992, the
draft constitution had been amended many times, and the text was
eclectic, full of compromises, less precise and politically less
progressive than initial versions.'4 Nevertheless, the working group
continued to face criticism from the increasingly aggressive CPD,
prompting repeated reworking of the draft with hopes of obtaining
approval.
The Commission released yet another draft for consideration at
the Sixth CPD in April 1992;'" however, ten days before the CPD
convened, Izvestiya, one of the main newspapers in Russia, published
an alternative draft prepared by Sergei Alekseev and Anatoly
Sobchak. 6 Both men were noted jurists and had been members of
the commission working on a new constitution for the USSR in 1989.
They were dissatisfied with the Commission's draft because they felt
it insufficiently protected civil rights, inadequately provided for
separation of powers to avoid a return to dictatorial rule, and was
unclear on "national-state structure.' ' 17 Their draft relied heavily on
the model constitution developed by Andrei Sakharov, a Nobel Peace
Prize winning Soviet dissident and human rights activist, prior to his
death in early 1990.18 Sobchak and Alekseev also advocated
convening a Constituent Assembly to ratify a new constitution,
arguing that the Congress lacked a popular mandate, having been
14. Sheinis, supra note 10, at 60.
15. SMITH, supra note 10, at 87; see also Tolz, supra note 10 (confirming that the
draft was published in ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, Mar. 12, 1992).
16. Sergei Alekseyev & Anatoly Sobchak, Konstitutsiya I sud'ba Rossii,
IZVESTIYA, Mar. 28-30, 1992, at 2.
17. SMITH,supra note 10, at 88.
18. Id. at 89.
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elected by a flawed process in 1990. Most importantly, in contrast to
the parliamentary system in the Commission's draft, Sobchak and
Alekseev advocated a strong presidency.' 9
The draft prepared for the Sixth CPD also disappointed Yeltsin
because it did not give him the magnitude of presidential powers he
desired. Therefore in March 1992, Yeltsin instructed his chief legal
adviser, Sergei Shakhrai, to draft an alternate proposal.' Shakhrai
wrote the first variant of this constitution in April 1992, based on both
Russian and Western influences.2' Angered by the weak role
Shakhrai's draft gave parliament, the CPD refused to consider it,
causing an initial break between the President and the Commission.
As the draft constitution faced these obstacles, the country
continued to operate under the old Soviet Constitution, which had
been amended by piecemeal measures over the years. As late as
April 1992, the Sixth CPD added extensive new changes to the
surviving Soviet Constitution, including several clauses from the
Commission's working draft.
Faced with mounting criticism for rejecting the Commission by
using his own legal advisers, Yeltsin returned to the Commission and
tried to persuade it to amend its third draft to increase the President's
powers. The Commission largely obliged Yeltsin by adding twenty
proposed amendments, but it was insufficient, and the brief attempt
at reconciliation was short lived. Despite the various amendments,
the Commission draft could not gain the favor of Yeltsin or the CPD.
At the Seventh CPD in December 1992, discussion of the draft was
again tabled, and adoption of a new constitution was again postponed
by a year, to the Tenth CPD, scheduled to begin in November 1993.
By January 1993, amidst growing conflict with the Russian
parliament, Yeltsin officially broke with the Commission and
assembled his own group of associates, including Shakhrai, to work
on a draft more favorable to the President.22 Shakhrai took his draft,
and with Yeltsin's permission, gave it to Alekseev, a prominent
theoretical lawyer and co-author of the earlier Alekseev-Sobchak
draft advocating a strong presidency. The pair met and realized the
similarities between their visions. After extensive collaboration, they
19. MCFAUL, Unfinished Revolution, supra note 10, at 168.
20. Tolz, supra note 10, at 3.
21. Interview with Sergei Shakhrai, in Moscow, Russ. (July 2003).
22. Id.
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published a new draft in March 1993.23 Unsurprisingly this draft also
established a strong presidential system with clear differentiation of
the powers of the President and Parliament.
In March 1993, the Eighth CPD refused to renew Yeltsin's
emergency powers and passed resolutions to sharply limit his
authority over the economy and the government's composition. This
dramatically increased the conflict's intensity. Then, on March 12,
1993, when Yeltsin stormed out after a turbulent appearance, the
CPD protected its interests by amending the existing constitution to
prevent the President from disbanding elected bodies. At the same
time, the CPD voted against holding the constitutional referendum
Yeltsin had proposed. In response, Yeltsin introduced special rule by
the President, which in retrospect never materialized.
On April 25, 1993, Russia held a national referendum to poll the
public for support of Yeltsin and the CPD. The day before the
referendum, Izvestiya published the main principles of another
constitutional draft, which Yeltsin fully supported. 24 Following his
victory in the national referendum, on April 30, 1993, Yeltsin
published the full text of what came to be called "the presidential
draft" in Izvestiya.25 This draft was substantially the same as that
published by Shakhrai and Alekseev in March 1993, with the details
now worked out by a group of well-known lawyers.26 With this move,
Yeltsin definitively withdrew support from the draft the
Commission's working group had prepared. Although the new draft
included more precise language, clear decisions on disputed issues,
and changes to the powers of the President with respect to
Parliament, the draft otherwise borrowed heavily from the
Commission's draft.27
To further remove power from the CPD, Yeltsin transferred the
power to draft the constitution to a newly established Constitutional
Assembly." Held from June to July of 1993, the 762-member
Assembly was divided into five groups29 and included representatives
23. Supra note 21.
24. Tolz, supra note 10, at 4.
25. Cohen, supra note 10, at 50.
26. Supra note 21.
27. Tolz, supra note 10, at 4 (explaining "[i]t retains about 60% of the
Constitutional Commissions' third draft.").
28. The Constitutional Assembly is sometimes called a "Conference" in the
literature, and thus can be easily confused with the Constitutional Commission.
29. The five working committees were Federal Organs of Power chaired by
2009]
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from federal governmental bodies, the Commission, regional
government bodies, local administrations, political parties, trade
unions, public organizations, religious organizations, manufacturers,
academia and entrepreneurs.
The Assembly based its work on both the April 30th presidential
draft and the Commission's draft. Additionally, it was presented with
summaries of 2000 comments and proposals regarding the drafts.
Shakhrai's working committee used a table comparing the original
Soviet Constitution, the Commission's draft, and the Shakhrai draft.
Shakhrai read a section and explained why it was written that way.
Then the delegates examined alternative options. If the Shakhrai
version was upheld they continued to the next section, otherwise,
compromise was necessary 0 From the proposals made by the five
committees, a Constitutional Arbitration Commission put together a
single draft.
The result was a draft constitution closely resembling the early
drafts proposed by the Commission. According to one of the
participants in this process, 60 percent of the resulting draft was taken
from the original Commission's text;3 however, according to
Shakhrai, 60 percent was taken from the presidential draft.32
Regardless, despite political difficulties, much of the Commission's
draft survived, with the major exception of a strong Presidency
replacing the Parliamentary system. The interim draft passed the
Assembly with 433 of 585 possible votes in late July 1993; however, it
was not finalized until after the events of fall 1993.
Undismayed, on July 16, 1993, Rumyantsev published a report
on the Commission's progress, followed four days later by a CPD bill
entitled "On the Procedures for Adopting the Constitution of the
Russian Federation." Intending to stop Yeltsin's drafting procedures,
the bill stated a new constitution must first be approved by the CPD
and then by the entire nation in a referendum. To circumvent the
President's draft, the CPD intended to finally pass the Commission's
Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and legal expert Alexander Yakovlev, Subjects
of the Federation chaired by Shakhrai, Stepanov and Antatolii Tyazhlov, Political
Parties and Social Organizations chaired by Sobchak and Victor Sheinis,
Entrepreneurs and State Enterprises and Municipalities chaired by First Deputy
Prime Minister Vladimri Shumeiko and legal expert Alekseev, and Discussion of
Issues Pertaining to Self-government chaired by Deputy Prime Minister Yurii Yarov
and people's deputy Boris Zolotukhin. Tolz, supra note 10, at 8.
30. Supra note 21.
31. Interview with Professor Mamut, in Moscow, Russ. (July 23, 2003).
32. Supra note 21.
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draft at the Tenth CPD rescheduled a month early for October 1993.
The continued stalemate between Yeltsin and the CPD came to a
head in the fall of 1993. On September 18, 1993, Yeltsin convened
the Federation Council, a group created the month before from
representatives of Russia's regions; however, they refused to endorse
his constitution. Desperate to circumvent the approaching Tenth
CPD, on September 21, 1993, Yeltsin announced Decree no. 1400,
"On the Step-by Step Constitutional Reform of the Russian
Federation," disbanding the Supreme Soviet, suspending elements of
the operating constitution and forbidding the Constitutional Court
from meeting until after new parliamentary elections. Naturally, the
CPD rejected this decree as unconstitutional, and the majority of the
Constitutional Court agreed. When Yeltsin refused to withdraw his
decree, the CPD declared Yeltsin no longer fit to rule, and on
September 23, 1993, approved Rutskoi, one of the CPD's deputies, as
Russia's new President. Signaling opposition to Yeltsin, CPD leaders
refused to leave their White House offices and, in a move eerily
reminiscent of the August 1991 fall of the Soviet Union, encouraged
people to defend the White House in the name of democracy and the
constitution.
On October 3, 1993, Rutskoi directed a mob to storm the
mayor's office and the state television station. In response, Yeltsin
ordered military forces to seize the White House. The next day,
special military forces launched a massive artillery attack against the
White House and its remaining occupants, including Rumyantsev.
Within hours, Yeltsin controlled Russia.
After these events, the balance of power within Russia shifted,
resulting in weakened support for both parliament and separation of
powers. Undoubtedly, this political reality affected the political
institutions in the still pending constitution, as Yeltsin's newly
acquired power allowed him to design new political rules for Russia.
On October 5, 1993, Yeltsin's chief of staff, Sergei Filatov,
proposed a constitutional referendum, and was assigned to convene a
smaller version of the Constitutional Assembly to prepare a
constitution reflecting the new political realities. The new draft
further expanded presidential powers, giving the President power to
appoint the Prime Minister, dismiss the government, and rule by
executive decree. Then, in November 1993, Yeltsin further changed
the draft constitution by dropping the federation treaty and reducing
the status of republics and regions. With the notable exception of
Rumyantsev, the same experts and deputies who had helped write the
20091
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Commission's draft, also worked on the final constitutional text.33 On
November 9, 1993, the new draft constitution was officially circulated
throughout Russia, and on December 12, 1993, the Constitution of
the Russian Federation was voted into effect.
If any clarity emerges from this complicated history, it is the
complexity of determining a direct link between various drafts and
the final adopted constitution. The drafts were rewritten, combined,
and compromised so many times that specific influences are difficult
to trace. The Russian Constitution approved in December 1993,
incorporated major elements of the presidential draft constitutions,
which in turn incorporated major elements of the Constitutional
Commission drafts. Despite the chaos, Western actors and ideas
played a role at various times within the complicated process of
adopting the final constitution.
B. Western Influence
Western ideas influenced Russia's constitution-writing process
both indirectly and directly. First, many key Russian participants in
the constitution writing process studied in the West. Second, the
Russians used Western legal documents for their research and
preparation. Third, many non-Western educated Russian
participants learned Western norms and ideas through subsequent
study. Finally, Western experts directly advised Russian individuals
who were directly involved in the drafting process.
i. Western Education
Despite the Soviet Union's barriers, many Russians had the
opportunity to study in the West. In particular, after the Soviet
Union opened up, numerous academic exchanges created a Western-
educated Russian intelligentsia. These academic exchanges, not
thought to have political consequences, provided Western exposure
which affected the Russian establishment.34 For example, Alexander
Yakovlev, the chair of one of the five working committees at the
Constitutional Assembly, first learned about the possibilities of a free
society as an exchange student at Columbia.35 Rumyantsev, the
Executive Secretary and de facto head of the Constitutional
Commission, studied in Hungary in his youth. He referred to this
33. Supra note 31.
34. See BILLINGTON, supra note 2, at 99-100.
35. See id.
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experience as "the last factor that led to my involvement in politics, as
I saw how there was more freedom in that country and more love of
freedom. I listened to lectures and read books published there.
Through these experiences, I began to understand many things.
3 6
The Russian Minister of Justice of the Soviet Union also traveled
to Great Britain to study its judicial system.33
ii. Western Sources
Additionally, the key participants in the writing of the Russian
Constitution used various Western constitutions and legal sources as
models. The Constitutional Commission's legal experts had mastered
not only Russian constitutional history, but also the French, U.S. and
German Constitutions." The Commission also consulted articles
regarding American constitutionalism. According to one historian,
"[t]hey undoubtedly saw themselves as the Jeffersons and Madisons
of Russia - scholar-politicians who would long be remembered as
Russia's founding fathers."39  The Commission's journal,
Konstitutsionnyi Vestnik, also documented the Commission's strong
interest in American constitutionalism, with articles on Alexander
Hamilton, and American separation of powers.40 The Commission
examined several state constitutions as well, including Illinois,
Oklahoma, and New Hampshire.41
Rumyantsev in particular was extremely familiar with and
influenced by foreign constitutional documents. He began an article
on "Russia's New Constitution" with the first paragraph of the
Declaration of Independence. He then revealed his knowledge of
world constitutions, writing, "[h]istory shows, however, that many a
worthy and enduring document has been produced in volatile,
politically unstable situations. One example from two centuries ago is
the U.S. Constitution of 1787. A more recent example is the Spanish
Constitution of 1977. ""2 He unabashedly acknowledged foreign
influences, admitting, "We had to search abroad and in other national
36. MICHAEL McFAUL & SERGEI MARKOV, THE TROUBLED BIRTH OF RUSSIAN
DEMOCRACY: PARTIES, PERSONALITIES, AND PROGRAMS 86 (1993).
37. Interview with Alexander Yakovlev, in Moscow, Russ. (July 2003).
38. Id.
39. ROBERT B. AHDIEH, RUSSIA'S CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION: LEGAL
CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY, 1985-1996 52 (1997).
40. Id. at 51.
41. Sharlet, supra note 2, at 59.
42. Oleg Rumyantsev, Russia's New Constitution, 2 J. DEMOCRACY 35,37 (1991).
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histories. There is nothing peculiar about that."43
Sergei Shakhrai, the main author of the presidential draft, also
studied Western constitutions to help him prepare his draft.' He
knew French and German history proficiently, and had studied the
German and American constitutions. He did not just have basic
familiarity with these documents, but rather knew them by heart.45
During the Constitutional Assembly deliberations the Russians
referenced foreign constitutional texts. Drawing from their collection
of sixteen sets of world constitutions, the Assembly particularly
examined the constitutions of Mexico, India, Germany, and the
United States.46 The journal devoted to the Assembly's drafting
process stated, "Excerpts from the French and German constitutions
in Russian translation were published along with articles on selected
features of the Belgian, Spanish, and even Indian constitutional
arrangements. ,
47
iii. Western Norms
Finally, many Russian academics studied Western history and
political theory and were aware of and influenced by Western norms
and ideas. Many legal scholars served on the various drafting
committees and they were the "most likely jurists to be
knowledgeable about Western European and common law legal
systems, having been exposed to works of Western legal philosophy
and having participated in international scholarly conferences."
4
These legal scholars associated with the Institute of State and Law
heavily influenced the Commission in pushing for legal reforms based
on expertise with the legal systems of the United States, France,
Germany, Scandinavia, Poland and Hungary.49
For example, Alexander Yakovlev penetrated the language
barrier and read forbidden books about U.S. history. '° According to
Yakovlev, "even then, studying the law was not a complete waste of
time. The great Western legal tradition was transmitted in this way.
43. David Remnick, Meet Oleg Rumyantsev, the James Madison of Russia, WASH.
POST, Sept. 3, 1990, at A10.
44. Supra note 21.
45. Id.
46. Interview with Leonid Smirnyagin, in Moscow, Russ. (July 16, 2003).
47. Sharlet, supra note 2, at 60.
48. SMITH, supra note 10, at 78.
49. Id. at 87.
50. Supra note 37.
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When I was a student, I even learned about the Roman legal
tradition."5 In particular, Yakovlev was impressed by common law
because you could throw legal codes out the window and eliminate
law, but you cannot throw out a system of precedents.52
Yakovlev was not unique in his fascination with Western legal
tradition. Rather, "Bourgeois Legal Theory" was consistently among
the most popular Soviet law school courses. According to the
director of the Institution of Training Prosecutorial investigators,
We were supposed to read the works of Locke, Hobbs, Rousseau,
and Jill so we could criticize them from a Marxist-Leninist
perspective. But, everyone simply wanted to learn about these
works and Western legal traditions because we wanted to introduce
them in this country someday.53
iv. Direct Western Influences
In addition to the indirect ways in which Western ideas
influenced the Russian framers, there were examples of the West
taking a more active role. This more active role did not take place at
the highest governmental levels, but rather by the involvement of
NGO's and individual advisors.
a. Lack of Influence by United States Government
Despite evidence that the State Department felt aiding
constitutional efforts was essential, the United States government did
not play a direct role in drafting the 1993 Russian Constitution. In
1992, the State Department wrote,
[B]ecause of the importance of Central and Eastern European legal
reforms to the American foreign policy agenda, we believe that
when U.S. Government funds are supporting an effort to provide
basic assistance to a foreign government related to the shaping of a
Constitution or the design and implementation of basic laws
establishing a legal system, it is imperative that the U.S.
Government be involved on a cooperative basis.54
Nevertheless, the U.S. Government did not oversee any coordinated
51. ALEXANDER M. YAKOVLEV, STRIVING FOR LAW IN A LAWLESS LAND:
MEMOIRS OF A RUSSIAN REFORMER 58 (1996).
52. Supra note 37.
53. SMITH,supra note 10, at 78.
54. Correspondence Concerning the Rule of Law Program in Central and
Eastern Europe, U.S. Department of State (Feb. 21, 1992) (on file with author).
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effort to influence constitution writing in Russia.
This may be because, as Russia began constitution writing,
President George H. W. Bush cautiously pursued maintaining the
status quo and supporting Gorbachev. By 1989, Gorbachev had
accepted free elections in Eastern Europe, the fall of the Berlin wall,
Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, and a pullback from the third
world. Since Gorbachev delivered on prioritized issues, the Bush
administration did not want to undermine him.5 Bush wrote in his
diary, "My view is, you dance with who is on the dance floor.., you
don't try to influence the succession, and you especially don't do
something that would give the blatant appearance of encouraging
destabilization."56 Bush condemned the coup as unconstitutional: "It
seems clearer all the time that contrary to official statements coming
out of Moscow that this move was extra-constitutional; outside of the
constitutional provisions for constitutional change."57 Therefore, the
key constitutional issue was upholding the Soviet Constitution to
support Gorbachev, not writing a new Russian constitution: "We are
not giving up on the restoration of the constitutional government in
the Soviet Union itself."58
After Yeltsin had clearly won, Bush avoided Russian domestic
politics, focusing instead on nuclear weapons, borders, and the
economy. Democracy was not high on the administration's priorities,
and Bush "did not offer Yeltsin advice about how to write a new
constitution. The idea would not even have crossed his mind."59
b. NGO Participation
Although the U.S. government avoided direct involvement in
Russian Constitution writing, they encouraged such efforts via Non-
Governmental Organizations ("NGOs").
Unlike the administration's silence, the Senate discussed changes
needed in the Russian Constitution in 1992. Senator Bradley argued,
"To minimize the risk of state oppression reemerging under the guise
of reform, [Russia needs] a constitutional bill of individual rights and
a viable legal structure. A new constitution and new elections could
55. JAMES M. GOLDGEIER & MICHAEL MCFAUL, POWER AND PURPOSE: U.S.
POLICY TOWARD RUSSIA AFTER THE COLD WAR 21 (2003).
56. Id. at 25.
57. Id. at 31-32.
58. Id. at 33.
59. Id. at 37.
[Vol. 32:1
The Influences of the West
also provide a better basis for legislating reforms unburdened by the
Communist past."' Although this speech did not directly influence
anything occurring in Russia, it may have led to greater willingness to
support NGO projects in this area.
The same year, Kenneth Starr, then solicitor general, wrote an
article to persuade U.S. judges and lawyers to assist the Russians with
their constitution. He emphasized that the U.S. should not impose a
constitution upon Russia, explaining,
The U.S. won the Cold War, but the new Russia is not a vanquished
postwar Japan waiting for a Western-style constitution to be
imposed upon it. As Russia is now doing, every newly freed society
must take its own road toward democratic rule through
constitution-building. But, to paraphrase Lenin, what can be done
on this side of the Atlantic to assist these young Russian
reformers?61
Starr felt the best approach was to develop a legal culture as "the
need is even greater for the American bench and bar to help,
voluntarily, Russia and the other new republics in building a law-
based society. ' '62 Starr wanted Americans to teach Russians about
civic life so they could make decisions themselves. He wrote,
[T]here is a growing danger that in that process, we in the West are
overlooking the hard, cold fact that Russian constitution-building
remains very fragile. The antidote is this: Redoubling the effort to
establish concrete linkages between the U.S. Russian legal
community. That is the most direct - and appropriate - way to bear
witness to Russia's continuing Constitutional Convention.
Appealing to American financial interests, Starr claimed,
"Constitution-building is emphatically not a revenue-producing
enterprise, but its ultimate moral and economic awards will be
abundantly great - not only for Russia and other republics, but also
for American business." '
The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) retained
60. Bill Bradley, Senator, Speech on the Senate Floor, (June 18, 1992), also
available at. http://www.billbradley.com/assets/PDF/920611_nationalPressClub.pdf
(providing text of the same speech given before the National Press Club on June 11,
1992).
61. Kenneth W. Starr, Rule of Law: Russia's Constitution Drafters Need Help
from the American Bar, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 1992, at A10.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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Russian contacts from its human rights efforts in the Soviet Union,
and was therefore perfectly situated to provide democracy assistance
in the early 1990s, in the form of grants to Russian organizations. In
one such grant, Freedom House, with a grant from the NED,
provided computer equipment to the Russian Constitutional
Commission to draft the new constitution for the Russian
Federation." Although the grant was only $15,000,66 by providing
technical support NED developed a friendly relationship with the
framers that could only help with good will for attempts to influence
the Russian Constitution more directly.
The Federal Bar Association and the American Bar Association
also had a presence in Russia in the early 1990s. In the summer of
1992, Starr headed a delegation to Moscow and Alma Ata intended to
encourage Russia's efforts. Involvement occurred at the highest
levels, with Alfred Belcuore, president of the FBA, and J. Michael
McWilliams, president of the ABA, going to Russia to encourage
reform, offer suggestions on draft provisions, and make crucial U.S.-
Russian legal connections.67 The FBA also accepted Rumyantsev's
request to organize a conference in Moscow to educate Russians on
constitutionalism.6 8
Another NGO which played a key role during the early 1990s
was the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs
("NDI"). Although mostly focusing on local governance and
electoral reform, in December 1991, NDI held a conference in
Moscow entitled "Democratic Governance in a Time of Crisis"
designed as an exchange of practical ideas on democratic governance
among Americans, Europeans, Latin Americans, and Russians. 69 "In
Russia, too little is understood about the ways in which political
institutions and processes function in democratic societies. NDI
hopes that the international delegation will employ its diverse
experiences and expertise to assist Russian reformers as they proceed
along the difficult road of economic and political reform., 70 Five
workshops addressed topics in constitutional design including the role
65. NAT'L ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY, 1991 ANNUAL REPORT: OCTOBER 1,
1990- SEPTEMBER 30, 1991 (1991).
66. Id.
67. Starr, supra note 61, at A10.
68. Id.
69. NAT'L DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE FOR INT'L AFFAIRS, DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNANCE IN A TIME OF CRISIS BRIEFING BINDER (1991) (on file with author).
70. Id.
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of the judiciary, and strategies for executive-legislative relations.
In the grandest example of NGO assistance, the FBA Section of
International Law, Freedom House, the NED, and the ABA Section
of International Law and Practice sponsored a videoconference
entitled "Symposium on the Russian Constitution." Held on
November 30, 1990, the symposium enabled Russian scholars and
members of the Constitutional Commission to discuss their first draft
constitution with American constitutional experts. The formal list of
participants for the two hour video-conference included Professors
Harold Berman, Albert Blaustein, Thomas Buergenthal, Dick
Howard and Herman Schwartz, attorney Bruce Fein, President of
NED Carl Gershman, attorney Neil Kritz, Solicitor General Kenneth
Starr, and Judge Stephen Williams of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit.71 Fein recalled that Yeltsin and his advisors asked
questions and the American experts responded. The participants
then shared drafts, ultimately culminating in a final document.
According to Fein, the discussion centered on general ideas of the
constitution: "where we thought there were flaws, what they had to
think about.""2
c. Western Expert Influences
Some of the most significant influence came from experts
operating in their individual capacities. Because the Russians usually
initiated these interactions, they were more receptive to the advice
given. Even Yeltsin acknowledged the influence of foreign advisors.
In his November 9, 1993, speech introducing the constitution's final
draft, he stated, "The draft constitution was assessed by experts in our
country and abroad."73  The end of the original Constitutional
Commission's draft lists individuals who worked on the constitution,
with the following acknowledgement attached: "4. Materials and
suggestions submitted by foreign experts: A. Blaustein (United
States) A. La Pergola (Italy) A. Rapachinskiy (United States)."74
71. Memorandum from Neil Kritz to the Panelists in the Symposium on the
Russian Constitution (Nov. 27, 1990) (on file with author).
72. Interview with Bruce Fein, in Wash., D.C. (June 20, 2003).
73. RETT R. LUDWIKOWSKI, CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN THE REGION OF FORMER
SOVIET DOMINANCE 66 (1996).
74. Draft of the Constitution of the Russian Federation 140 (unpublished draft,
undated, but presumed to be October 1990, on file with author) (English translations
provided to author by NED and Judge Stephen Williams) [hereinafter, Draft
Constitution].
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The first foreign expert listed, Albert Blaustein,75 was a professor
at Rutgers Law School, a notorious constitutional consultant, and a
16draftsman of over two-dozen constitutions. Blaustein's involvement
with the Russian constitution began when Rumyantsev sought his
help. Blaustein eagerly agreed to advise on the new document and
began meeting with Russia's Constitutional Commission. In July
1990, Rumyantsev visited Blaustein and they toured Philadelphia.
According to Blaustein, this trip had a profound influence on
Rumyantsev: "He really was inspired. You could see it in his face., 77
A year later Blaustein and Rumyantsev were reunited in Moscow. A
Philadelphia newspaper wrote, "The two are playing a key role in
writing a new constitution for the Russian Republic. 78 Although the
story may have exaggerated Blaustein's role by portraying the men as
partners, Blaustein did play an important advisory role. Blaustein
explained that "[Rumyantsev] sought guidelines on what should be
included in a modern constitution. At his request, I prepared a
constitutional outline which was then translated into Russian as the
working Commission agenda., 79 If the article exaggerated Blaustein's
role, he did not. As he clarified, "I am not here to tell them what to
do. These people need a Russian constitution. I am basically here to
answer questions." ' In pursuing this role, Blaustein "never imposed
his view" and preferred the "job of facilitator."'"
Nor did Blaustein emphasize the U.S. Constitution as a necessary
model, or try to impose the United States' legal system. Blaustein
understood such tact was particularly essential in Russia where
leaders were sensitive to accusations of imitating the West.82 He
explained, "I am a comparative constitutionalist possessing an
American passport. The American constitutionalist who knows only
75. Blaustein passed away in 1994 and so could not be interviewed. Instead the
author interviewed Stephen Harmelin, a colleague of Blaustein's. Interview with
Stephen Harmelin, in Phil, Pa. (Aug. 18, 2003).
76. 138 CONG. REC. 33375 (1992) (statement of Rep. Smith).
77. Fen Montaigne, N.J. Man Gives Russia Historic Help: When Russia Finishes
its Constitution, an American Can Take Some Credit, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, July
21, 1991, at A3.
78. Id.
79. Albert Blaustein, The Craft of Constitution-Making, 138 CONG. REc. 33,375
(1992).
80. Id.
81. Interview with Stephen Harmelin, in Phil, Pa. (Aug. 18, 2003).
82. Id.
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the American Constitution can play only a confined, restricted role."'83
Instead, Blaustein answered questions on subjects from creating an
appeals court system to constitutionally limiting the Russian military.
He helped draft the free speech section and debated the shape of the
Russian legislature with the commission's members.'
The second expert listed was Antonio La Pergola,85 an attorney
in Rome who spoke good English and was also on the Italian
constitutional court." He was the Italian equivalent of Blaustein,
providing advice to the Constitutional Commission and Rumyansev
in particular.
The third foreign expert listed, Andrzej Rapaczynski, also played
an important role as advisor to Rumyansev. A lifelong academic with
a background in philosophy, Rapaczynski also advised Poland
regarding their constitution and legal system. Rapaczynski authored
a memorandum to Rumyansev, dated August 18, 1990, but sent
September 10, 1990, which was translated and distributed to the
deputies working on the constitution."' The accompanying letter
stated that the memorandum was "in accordance with your request,"
indicating Rumyantsev solicited it."" The memorandum presented
basic points Rapaczynski felt "should be considered in preparing the
constitution of the Russian Federation."89  The memorandum
included advice on the legal and political status of the constitution,
the amendment process, constitutional terminology, the parliament
and government, the president, federalism, and human rights. 9°
In a subsequent November 7, 1990, memorandum to "The
Working Group of the Constitutional Committee of the Russian
Federation," Rapaczynski commented on selected provisions of the
October 1990 draft Constitution referring to specific articles and
suggested changes.9 Rapaczynski followed this with a document in
83. Blaustein, supra note 79.
84. Montaigne, supra note 77.
85. Unfortunately, due to practical limitations, I was unable to interview La
Pergola.
86. Supra note 81.
87. Memorandum from Andrzej Rapaczynski to Oleg G. Rumyantsev (Aug. 18,
1990) (on file with author).
88. Letter from Andrzej Rapaczynski to Oleg G. Rumyantsev (Sept. 10, 1990)
(on file with author).
89. Id.
90. Supra note 87.
91. Memorandum from Andrzej Rapaczynski to the Working Group of the
Constitutional Committee of the Russian Federation (Nov. 7, 1990) (on file with
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which he analyzed three areas of constitutional reform for the
Committee to prioritize: the structure of the central authorities of the
new Russian state, the relations between the central government and
ethnic or territorial components of the Russian federation, and the
relations between the Russian state and its citizens. Rather than
proceeding article by article as he had done before, Rapaczynski
made broad conceptual suggestions addressing his concerns and
praises in an article-like format. 2  On November 10, 1990,
Rapaczynski sent a memorandum with additions to his earlier
remarks addressing the proposed structure of the central authorities
of the Russian Federation in the "parliamentary variant."'93 Finally,
Rapaczynski wrote a speech for the Constitutional Committee on
November 12, 1990. Unfortunately, the speech was never delivered
because of Yeltsin's last minute change of mind; however, the fact
that such a speech was scheduled shows that Russians were
entertaining outside voices as they prepared their constitution.
Although to a lesser degree than Blaustein and Rapaczynski,
other American experts edited and commented on various drafts of
the Constitutional Commission. For example, Harold Berman
commented on various aspects of the constitution, largely praising the
efforts of the Russians.94 An Emory Law School Professor, Berman
had published a prize winning book on the formation of Western
legal thought which had been published in many languages, including
Russian. Berman had also studied in Russia at the Institute of State
and Law, where he founded and co-directed a program of instruction
in American law for Russians.
Attorney Roslyn A. Mazer wrote a letter dated November 19,
1990, to Carl Gershman, the president of NED, in which she thanked
him "for the draft of the Russian Constitution and the invitation to
Lipset's talk. I hope to make it on the 29th. I do plan to read the
Russian draft... Did you have any thing formal in mind in terms of
my comments or is there a need to do it sooner?" 95 Presumably
author).
92. Andrzej Rapaczynski, The New Constitution of the Russian Federation: Its
Principles and Its Effects, Text for the Constitutional Committee (Nov. 9, 1990) (on
file with author).
93. Supra note 91.
94. Harold J. Berman, Notes on the 1990 Draft Constitution of the Russian
Federation (Nov. 27, 1990) (unpublished, on file with author).
95. Letter from Roslyn A. Mazer to Carl Gershman (Nov. 19, 1990) (on file with
author).
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Gershman asked Mazer to comment on the early draft constitution to
be incorporated into a response to the Russians.
Similarly, Bruce Fein got involved because he had worked with
Blaustein on some joint projects. Therefore, when Rumyantsev was
in the United States, Blaustein and Fein spoke with him, and Fein
gave him specific advice. 96 A Harvard Law School graduate, Fein
made himself a constitutional law consultant and was involved in the
constitutional revisions of three-dozen countries, including Spain,
South Africa, Cyprus and Mozambique.
Professor Herman Schwartz had been involved in drafting a new
constitution for the Czech Republic, and therefore was asked to
participate in the November 1990 videoconference. As a result of this
initial involvement, Schwartz started going to Moscow regularly
through June 1993. He worked with the Constitutional Commission
and in particular with Valerii Zorkin, one of the experts, and later
head of the Russian Supreme Court, in addition to Rumyantsev.
Schwartz analyzed and commented on many drafts, dealing with a
range of issues. Nevertheless, Schwartz summed up his own
involvement as "some influence, [but] not very much. 97
Judge Stephen Williams also became involved with the Russian
constitution through the NED videoconference. Although his
involvement was minimal, he did draft two sets of comments on the
draft constitution of the Russian Federation.98
Individuals from other countries also played a role in Russia. In
addition to La Pergola representing Italy, there were scholars from
Germany, Austria and France. These experts were invited
unofficially, usually because they had friends working on the Russian
constitution, so that they would discuss it informally, and give advice
in that form.'
96. Supra note 72.
97. Interview with Herman Schwartz, in Wash, D.C. (Aug. 21, 2003).
98. Stephen F. Williams, Comments on the Draft Constitution of the Russian
Federation (Nov. 29, 1990) (unpublished comment, on file with author) [hereinafter,
Williams, Comment One]; Stephen F. Williams, Comments on the Draft Constitution
of the Russian Federation (Dec. 4, 1990) (unpublished comment, on file with author)
[hereinafter, Williams, Comment Two].
99. Supra note 31.
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III. Western Influences on Particular Constitutional Provisions
To better understand how the foregoing Western influences
interacted with the writing of the Russian constitution, it is useful to
examine specific examples. This section examines Western influences
on the structure of government, federalism, and the bill of rights.
A. Structure of Government
i. Presidency
One of the most divisive aspects of the drafting of the Russian
Constitution was the role of the President. When the Russians began
writing the Constitution, the USSR still existed, and they debated
whether to even have a President. The idea for a Russian presidential
office came from democratic circles immediately after the first session
of the CPD in Spring 1990, when it became obvious that they
controlled a minority of seats in the new parliament.1°° In May 1990,
the new CPD narrowly elected Boris Yeltsin as Chairman, as the
result of his support for Russian sovereignty, on which Russian
democrats, nationalists and mid-level communists all agreed. As
other issues arose, Yeltsin's majority weakened, and by March 1991, a
petition had been circulated to remove him as chairman.
Under the threat of such a vote, Yeltsin's allies envisioned the
presidency as a tool to protect him from the conservative CPD. Polls
revealed Yeltsin was more popular with the general population than
with deputies, leading him to believe he could win an electoral
mandate and place himself in a stronger political position. Therefore,
"[t]he push to create a Russian presidency was in response to a
concrete political situation and was not the result of a carefully-
plotted strategy or philosophy about the need for a separation of
powers or checks and balances."'01
Although the motivation was political, momentum for the
presidency was propelled by Western notions of separation of power
and checks and balances. Yakovlev recalled,
100. See Michael McFaul, Institutional Design, Uncertainty and Path Dependency
during Transitions: Cases from Russia, 10 CONST. POL. ECON. 27, 34 (1999).
101. Id. at 34.
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I was asked particularly to present to the Congress of People's
Deputies the idea of the presidency... I was telling the people that
the presidency we need is not to have a president as the chief of
everything in the country. We must have a president as the chief of
the executive branch, and so we first of all must very clearly make
these three divisions of power separate, legislative, executive and
judicial. And I asked why the president is the head of the executive
branch? What does he execute? He executes law. And so we need
the president as the head of the executive branch.'O'
Gorbachev's allies opposed the Russian presidency because it
would weaken the Soviet president who had not won a direct election.
The directly elected conservative deputies, however, could not
oppose another direct election. They were unsure of Yeltsin's
popularity, and how the people would respond to their opposition.
Instead of openly resisting the idea, they decided to make the new
presidency largely symbolic. Since the CPD had exclusive power over
amending the Russian constitution, they felt they could constrain
Yeltsin's powers through the amendment process.
The Russians held a referendum on the presidency in March
1991, prior to delineating the powers of the president, or
incorporating those powers into the remnants of the Soviet
Constitution. The referendum succeeded with 69.9 percent voting in
favor of the presidency. Three months later, Yeltsin was
unambiguously elected Russia's first President. In this manner, the
Russians created the presidency outside the constitution-writing
process. Although Yeltsin's opponents still hoped to create a balance
of power favoring the CPD, institutional persistence would make it
difficult to eliminate the presidency.
Having created a presidency, the Russians still had to choose
between a parliamentary system, a presidential system, or some
variant of the two models. The main American advisers did not
blindly push the American model in which the president holds nearly
the entire executive power. Rapaczynski wrote that he "would not
advise the creation of an American-style presidency in Russia. The
American system, admirable as it is in the United States, has not been
successfully transplanted anywhere in the world."' 3  Rather,
Rapaczynski questioned whether Russia should follow a German
model where the president is a representative figurehead or a French
102. Supra note 37.
103. Supra note 87.
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model where the president has considerable power. Rapaczynski did
not advise between these choices, but presented the conditions under
which each model may be preferred, and left it to the Russians to
decide."
As the result of the political situation that created the
presidency, the CPD and therefore the Constitutional Commission
were predisposed toward a weak presidency. When their American
advisors also did not advocate an American-style presidency, they
followed their inclination and did not choose an American-style
strong presidency.
As the political situation changed, Yeltsin wanted a stronger
presidency than that proposed by the Commission. Therefore, when
he asked Sergei Shakhrai, his chief legal advisor, to create a
counterproposal, his sole specific instruction was to create a strong
presidential republic put into the law in a way that it could not easily
be changed.' Furthermore, many Western economic advisors
preferred a strong President who would be more capable of heading
economic reforms. Even once Yeltsin had chosen a strong
presidency, the Russians had a variety of options, and the West had
potential influence within the political limitations.
This combination of politics and outside influences led to the
model chosen, which, according to Giorgi Satarov, a member of the
presidential group, was most similar to the French model."° Nor was
the resemblance to the French model accidental. The experts
understood the difficulties and lack of stability inherent in writing a
constitutional text, and they sought stability. They considered a
parliamentary republic, but they felt Russia was not ready for one.
Russia was ready in principle for a presidential republic.' 7 When
Yeltsin sought to delineate the scope of his presidential role,
Yakovlev had some de Gaulle speeches translated into Russian, and
asked Yeltsin's advisers to give him the speeches. Yakovlev believes
Yeltsin became enchanted with de Gaulle and had his advisors
structure the constitution based on the de Gaulle presidency. 8
Shakhrai acknowledged that in writing the presidential draft he
used the French model, and that ideologically the Russian and French
104. Supra note 87.
105. Supra note 21.
106. Interview with Giorgi Satarov, in Moscow Russ. (July 22, 2003).
107. Supra note 31.
108. Supra note 37.
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models were very similar.'09 As discussed above, both Yakovlev and
Shakhrai were extremely familiar with the French system. A French
influence occurred because key Russian actors were familiar with the
French system, admired it, felt it applied to the Russian situation, and
borrowed from it. Therefore, while political considerations led to the
strong presidency, the specific French form of that strong presidency
resulted from indirect Western influences on the Russian drafters.
Although the main structure was modeled after the French
system, various aspects of the presidency drew upon a variety of
Western sources. For example, the presidential draft "clearly
absorbed a number of features of the American system such as the
presidential prerogative to control the executive; the right of the
president to veto any law enacted by the parliament, subject to the
overruling vote of a two-thirds majority; and the right to be elected in
nationwide elections for a six-year term in tandem with a vice
president who would automatically become speaker of the
parliaments' upper chamber."' 0
The impeachment section also resembles its American
counterpart. The debate regarding impeachment was evenly
balanced within the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation. This
allowed Yakovlev to successfully advocate the American system,
which he admired due to his respect for the United States
Constitution."' Yakovlev explained:
In the final draft of the constitution, far-reaching changes were
made in the procedure for impeaching the president. Again, I had
cause to speak on this topic. I reminded my audience that an
impeachment procedure exists in the United States, but that in
Russia the grounds for removing the president from office were
much more broadly defined."2
Yakovlev influenced the constitution through his role as head of
a work-group at the Constitutional Assembly by giving a speech
discussing the impeachment procedure of the United States as a
model for the Russian procedure:
In my presentation to the Assembly I stressed that a sharp
distinction should be made between actions by the president that
the Constitutional Court rules unconstitutional and actions that
109. Supra note 21.
110. LUDWIKOWSKI, supra note 73, at 58-59.
111. Supra note 37.
112. YAKOVLEV, supra note 51, at 176.
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form the basis for impeachment. While the first is a normal process
of constitutional control, the second should be limited to high
treason or other serious crimes. I cited Article 2, Section 4, of the
United States Constitution, and thus succeeded in having the
grounds for impeachment of the president reformulated along these
lines in the final draft of the constitution.
13
Yakovlev's claims are consistent with the text of the drafts
themselves. The earliest 1990 draft dealt with presidential
impeachment in Article 5.3.4. Section 2:
The President may be removed if he commits a criminal violation
of the Constitution or the laws (variant: "if he commits a
particularly dangerous state crime"). The decision to initiate
impeachment proceedings against the President based on such
charges may be taken by either of the chambers of Parliament by a
two-thirds vote. The matter is then submitted to the Supreme
Court, which must issue its ruling. The final decision, based on the
Supreme Court indictment, must be approved by the other
chamber. The impeachment of the President must be approved by
at least two-thirds of the votes.
T
The variation in this section confirms Yakovlev's claim that the
original drafters did not have a consensus regarding exactly how
impeachment should work. The original draft allowed the initiation
of impeachment procedures if the president committed a criminal
violation of the Constitution, or if he committed a particularly
dangerous state crime. A criminal violation of the Constitution could
consist of anything the constitutional court found unconstitutional.
Yakovlev advocated restricting impeachment to something closer to
the second variant, a particularly dangerous state crime, such as
treason. Judge Williams also showed that the definitions of these
words concerned him by underlining the words "criminal violation" in
his version of the draft. "5 The final constitution reads, "The President
of the Russian Federation may be impeached by the Federation
Council only on the basis of charges put forward against him of high
treason or some other grave crime."' 6 This supports Yakovlev's
113. YAKOVLEV,supra note 51, at 176-77.
114. Draft Constitution, supra note 74, at 65.
115. Stephen F. Williams, Comments Directly on Text of the Draft Constitution of
the Russian Federation (1990) (unpublished) (on file with author) [hereinafter,
Williams, Text Comments].
116. Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF] [Constitution] art. 93, § 1
[hereinafter Konst. RF].
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claim that the Russians incorporated his American-influenced advice.
The Russians also struggled to determine what branches of
government may initiate and approve impeachment. The 1990 draft
stated that the Supreme Court must indict the President, and that the
indictment "of the President must be approved by at least two-thirds
of the votes." As noted in the margin notes of Judge Williams's copy
of the draft constitution, it is unclear whether this refers to the first or
second chamber.
1 17
Yakovlev's Western influences again affected this aspect of the
impeachment provisions, as this section was also disputed within the
Supreme Soviet. As a result of his respect for the United States,
Yakovlev advised that the Russians adopt the American system of
impeachment, with the Supreme Court, and both chambers of the
Supreme Soviet being necessary for impeachment.1 ' The actual
Russian constitution verifies Yakovlev's influence as impeachment
must be confirmed by "a ruling of the Supreme Court of the Russian
Federation""' 9 and decided upon by "two-thirds of the total number in
each of the chambers.'
20
Both aspects of the impeachment example demonstrate that
when a particular provision is disputed, Western norms can sway the
balance via an indirect influence.
Within the broad realm of presidential powers, discussion arose
regarding the amount of power a President should have in a state of
emergency. The Soviet Union constantly struggled with the problem
of a state of emergency. The State Committee for the State of
Emergency, which was created to address this problem, ultimately
turned against Gorbachev in the August Putsch of 1991. In addition,
the state of emergency was constantly evoked as a threat to
consolidate power during the Yeltsin-parliament showdown. 2' As a
result of these experiences, the Russians maintained strong opinions
regarding states of emergency, and were only partly receptive to
Western advice on this topic.
The Western advisors correctly realized a state of emergency
traditionally allows leaders to go above the law to obtain
unauthorized power, and wanted to ensure this did not happen. Early
117. Williams, Text Comments, supra note 115.
118. Supra note 37.
119. Konst. RF, supra note 116, art. 93, § 1.
120. Konst. RF, supra note 116, art. 93, § 2.
121. McFAUL, Unfinished Revolution, supra note 10, at 188-89.
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on, Blaustein asked the Russians, "What are the limitations which
you will want to prescribe for a state of emergency?' ' 22 Similarly, in
response to the early draft constitution Rapaczynski wrote,
I do not understand why you give this power to the President when
the Parliament is actually sitting. It seems to me that a
parliamentary emergency law could be passed very quickly, and the
parliamentary control may be very important. While parliamentary
approval within three days may seem to be nearly the same thing,
in fact the state of emergency (especially if it involves mass arrests
etc.) can change the atmosphere very quickly and effectively. I
think the delay of a few hours is worth it... Please consider this
- 123
very carefully.
The drafters partly followed Rapaczynski's advice to limit state
of emergency situations by leaving the circumstances and procedures
under which the president can impose a state of emergency to be
determined by Federal Constitutional Law and not the constitution
itself. The final constitution reads: "Under the circumstances and
procedures envisaged by the Federal Constitutional Law, the
President of the Russian Federation shall impose a state of
emergency on the territory of the Russian Federation or in areas
thereof with immediate notification of the Federation Council and
the State Duma. ' , 124 Given Yeltsin's conflicts with the Parliament, and
his control over the constitution-writing process, understandably the
Russians did not limit the state of emergency to the situation when
the parliament was not in session.
ii. Legislature
Like the presidency, the Russians already had a parliament
before they adopted their new constitution. This meant that there
would inevitably be a parliament in the new system as well; however,
the Russians had many models from which to choose.
Rapaczynski took for granted that the Russian parliament would
have two chambers elected similarly to the American model: "I
presume that, given the federal nature of the state, the Russian
parliament will have two houses, with the lower house being
popularly elected and the upper house representing the states., 125 In
122. Blaustein, supra note 79.
123. Supra note 91.
124. Konst. RF, supra note 116, art. 88.
125. Supra note 91, at 7.
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giving this advice, however, he was taking into account the realities of
the Russian system, and specifically the federal nature of the state.
As assumed, the original draft constitution set up a Federal
Parliament with two chambers, the Chamber of People's
Representatives and the Federal Council.126 As suggested, the former
was elected by citizens of the Russian Federation on the basis of a
uniform standard of representation, while the latter consisted of an
equal number of representatives from each republic and federal
127territory.
The final constitution also has two houses: "The Federal
Assembly shall consist of two chambers - the Federation Council and
the State Duma., 128 The final constitution does not specify how the
two chambers would be determined. Although the Federation
Council was intended to represent the various regions, the
constitution does not specify an exact election procedure, but rather
provided for it to be determined by a law separate from the
constitution. This may be due to the difficult political situation
involving the regions.
Although Rapaczynski supported a two chamber American style
parliament, he did not advocate the American system of distributing
power between the two chambers, explaining, "the American system,
in which the two houses have approximately equal powers, is too
cumbersome and should not be reproduced.', 129 Instead, he proposed
"that most of the legislative power be vested in the lower house, with
the upper house being able to do not much more than to slow the
legislative process." This balance of power more closely resembles
the British Commons and House of Lords than the American
legislative bodies. The Russians partially took this advice. Although
the Federal Council was given significantly more power than the
House of Lords, the final constitution allowed the lower house to
override the upper house's objections with a super-majoritarian vote.
The Russians followed Rapaczynski's advice regarding the
legislative branches more closely in other areas. In response to the
original constitutional draft, Rapaczynski advised that the number of
deputies should be specified as well as limited:
I would specify the number of deputies (either directly or by stating
126. Draft Constitution, supra note 74, at ch. 5.4.
127. Draft Constitution, supra note 74, at 69.
128. Konst. RF, supra note 116, art. 95, § 1.
129. Supra note 91, at 7.
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how many people per one deputy). I would also very strongly urge
you not to follow the Soviet practice of making the Parliament very
numerous, since it only serves to weaken that body. I think that
450 is the maximum number.13°
The Russians took Rapaczynski's advice to heart, and the Duma
consists of precisely his recommended maximum number of 450
deputies. 131
Finally, the Russians had to determine the extent to which they
wanted a truly autonomous legislature, with parliament as a distinct
branch from the executive, and true separation of powers between
the branches. This principle does not exist in many non-American
Western systems.132 In the British and German systems, the prime
minister and cabinet must be members of parliament. By contrast, in
the U.S. presidential system, no member of one branch of
government may serve on either of the other two branches at the
same time so as to ensure the separation of powers. The most recent
French constitution provides for a combination presidential-
parliamentary system, where the prime minister and the cabinet may
not sit in parliament, yet the lower house of parliament may censure
the government and cause it to resign. The Russian system combines
these models, drawing heavily on the French variant.
The Russian Constitution forbids any member of the lower
house to serve in either the executive or judicial branches while
serving in the lower house of parliament, but is silent as to whether a
member of the upper house may do so."' Adopting the French
model, the lower house may censure the government. Similarly, as in
France, the lower house may not censure the President in domestic
and foreign affairs."'
In addition to the question of parliamentary members'
130. Supra note 91, at 7.
131. Konst. RF, supra note 116, art. 95, § 3.
132. See Ronald C. Monticone, A Brief Comparative Analysis of the Russian
Constitution, in CONSTITUTION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, SPECIAL
PRESIDENTIAL EDITION: WITH COMMENTARIES AND INTERPRETATION BY AMERICAN
AND RUSSIAN SCHOLARS (Vladimir v. Belyakov & Walter J. Raymond eds. 1994.)
133. But see supra note 72 (explaining that even if the Russian constitution set up
an autonomous lower branch on paper, determining whether a legislature is truly
autonomous has more to do with how procedures are set up, and less to do with the
constitution itself. Unlike the U.S. system, the Russians did not develop the idea of
the informing power rather than the legislating power of Congress by means of
oversight hearings, inquiries, and subpoenaing executives).
134. Monticone, supra note 132, at 10-11.
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participation in other branches of government, other provisions help
determine the degree of parliamentary autonomy. Generally, the
provisions addressing the autonomy of the Russian parliament
combine the French and American systems: "As far as the
distribution of power is concerned, the drafters initially attempted to
duplicate the American system of checks and balances, but they
ended up with a model that combines French and American
features." '135 This is particularly true in provisions such as whether the
President can veto laws or dissolve the parliament. "The Russian
president has a right to veto laws, which the French president lacks,
and the right to dissolve parliament, which has not been vested in his
American counterpart., 136 The Russians may have reacted to the
traditional socialist idea of parliamentary superiority, by using limits
on the parliament to help achieve a separation of power, in order to
prevent an overly strong parliamentary system.137 More likely, this
may reflect Yeltsin's increasing power over the course of the drafting
process, and his fear of parliament's powers under the circumstances.
Under that explanation, the political situation caused the Russians to
borrow from the aspects of various Western models that gave less
authority to the parliament.
The Russians had a variety of legislative models. In certain cases
the Russians took the advice of their Western advisors on specific
provisions, such as the size of the parliament. More often, familiarity
with the American and French systems allowed the Russians to
borrow from each system when it suited their political needs to limit
the power of the legislature.
iii. Judiciary
The nature and function of the judiciary was among the most
contentious constitutional issues that divided the post-Soviet elites.'38
Blaustein explained: "Because Communist practice made the courts
largely adjuncts of the executive, training and habit of members of the
Commission resulted in opposition to the judicial review concept.' 139
An independent judiciary was controversial for Russia because
judicial independence did not exist under communism where courts
135. LUDWlKOWSKI,supra note 73, at 67.
136. Id.
137. See id. at 202.
138. Andrew Rutten, Reviews, 8 CONST. POL. ECON 261, 262 (1997) (book review).
139. Blaustein, supra note 79.
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were simply puppets of the executive."4 As a result of the Russian
experience with the judiciary as a subordinate branch of the
executive, the Constitutional Commission understandably opposed
giving the judiciary the power to review legislative decisions. They
feared that doing so would allow the executive to overrule
unfavorable legislative decisions through its judicial arm.
Yet, for the same reason that the Russians hesitated to adopt
judicial review, the American advisors pushed it because "without
judicial review there aren't many checks on the abuses of the
executive that [the Russians] found so horrifying from Lenin
onwards. The constitution has become virtually a paper tire without
judicial review.''. Similarly, Berman felt that "[i]n light of Soviet
historical experience, the decisive role given to the judiciary in
enforcing the Constitution is perhaps its most striking feature.,
142
Also taking into account precisely this judicial history, Blaustein felt
it was particularly important for the Russians to have not only an
independent judiciary, but also judicial review, and tried very hard to
convince the Russians to adopt it. 43 He reflected, "It took a lot of
personal persuasion before I convinced Oleg Rumyantsev, secretary
of the Yeltsin Constitutional Commission, that a constitutional court
was important for the future of Russia. And I am pleased to report
that such a court is now in operation."'"
Although the experts advocated judicial review, they did not
believe judicial review had to be done exactly as in the United States.
Rather, Blaustein criticized the efforts of some American lawyers to
try to educate the Russians about the Supreme Court. Blaustein
understood that the American system would not work the same way
in Russia, and "the disinclination grew stronger as some well-meaning
American lawyers regaled the Russian lawyers on the details of U.S.
Supreme Court decisions.' 45 Blaustein's criticism alludes to over-
zealous American lawyers who pushed the Supreme Court model;
however, the most influential advisors invited by the Russians did not
fall into this category. Stanley Katz, a constitutional scholar and
participant in an exchange between American experts and Russian
draftors, confirmed that some Americans pushed their own system:
140. Sharlet, supra note 2, at 65.
141. Supra note 72.
142. Berman, supra note 94, at 6.
143. Blaustein, supra note 79.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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Well-known federal judges on my panel advised our Russian guests
to assume a conception of judicial review just like the American,
even to the point of suggesting that the proposed court limit itself
to deciding controversies that arise in an adversarial context-
imposing our notion of 'standing to sue' on the Russians.
46
For Katz, they evoked the criticism of Western advisors as being
unknowledgeable about the history of the country that they were
advising: "As these judges spoke, I wondered how much Russian legal
history they knew. I do know that they totally misunderstood the role
of European constitutional courts, which is very different from the
historic role played by the American Supreme Court."'' 7 This critique
did not apply to Rapaczynski, Fein, and Blaustein, who did not
blindly push the American system. Rather, their justifications for
judicial review evoked the unique Russian experience with the Soviet
system, and not some notion of judicial review as necessary for all
countries. They may have succeeded in convincing the Russians to
adopt a judicial review system, despite the Russian hesitance to do so,
precisely because they did not blindly advocate their own system, but
instead explained why judicial review made sense considering the
Russian history of executive abuse. Their success may also be
explained by the fact that some individual Russian actors, such as
Rumyantsev, were enamored with an independent judiciary as a
result of their knowledge of the American system. When
Rumyantsev came to visit the United States, his American hosts
introduced him to federal judges, who explained how an independent
judiciary worked. This was particularly important because the
concept was new to the Russians.48
Ultimately, the combination of powerful, unambiguous advice
which considered the Soviet experience, and sympathetic key Russian
actors, convinced the Russians to choose an independent judiciary
modeled after the West. The original draft constitution "provides for
the independence of the judiciary, and implements this by an
appropriate method of selection of judges and by ensuring their
tenure until they reach retirement age."'4 9  Although judicial
independence was threatened during the power struggle, it ultimately
survived the political chaos and remains in the final constitution:
146. STANLEY N. KATZ, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE: SOME
NEGATIVE LESSONS FROM THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 24 (1994).
147. Id.
148. Supra note 81.
149. Berman, supra note 94, at 6.
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"Judges shall be independent and shall obey only the Constitution of
the Russian Federation and the federal law."'"5 Nor is this an issue of
mere lip service without any teeth, since the constitution goes on to
explain that judges may not be replaced, or have their powers
terminated, and that judges possess immunity."'
Once they decided to have judicial review, the Russians still had
to choose between various Western models. They took this
responsibility seriously, as "[v]arious approaches to this subject would
be considered, in particular the American, Austrian, German, and
French models, but in the end, continental models were favored over
an American approach."'' 2 The Russian judicial system closely
resembles the German system, which splits the appellate and
constitutional aspects of the judicial system into separate
institutions.' 3 The Russian system allows the Constitutional Court to
review laws if requested to do so by the President, the Supreme
Arbitration Court and local legislative and executive bodies.
Individuals can also take their cases to the Constitutional Court in
original jurisdiction if they feel that their constitutional rights and
freedoms have been violated. "Thus the Constitutional Court in the
Russian Federation performs a role more similar to that of the
Federal Constitutional Court of Germany than to the Supreme Court
of the United States or the Constitutional Council of France."'54
B. Federalism
Aside from the legislative-executive conflict, federalism was the
most prominent issue in Russia in the early 1990s. The Russians
faced difficult questions: Who would control Russia's vast resources?
Are the republics sovereign, and therefore able to conduct their own
foreign policies or secede from the Federation? Whose laws are
supreme, and in what domains? Should Russia's federalism be
symmetric, or should the historically autonomous ethnic republics be
treated differently?'55 Federalism challenged the Russians because
150. Konst. RF, supra note 116, art. 120, § 1.
151. Konst. RF, supra note 116, arts. 121-22.
152. Sharlet, supra note 2, at 65.
153. See LUDWIKOWSKI, supra note 73, at 64; see also SMiTH, supra note 10, at 134
(concluding the "Russian Constitutional Court was modeled on the constitutional
courts of Western Europe, especially the German Federal Constitutional Court.").
154. Monticone, supra note 132, at 12-14.
155. Peter C. Ordeshook, Institutions and Incentives: Reexamining Russia, 2 J. OF
DEMOCRACY (ISSUE 2) 52 (1995).
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under the Soviet Union the republics each had their own
constitutions, governments, and unique relationship to the central
authority in Moscow. Yet Russia was so closely associated with the
central Soviet government that the Russian republic had never
created a separate constitution or government. Therefore, while the
republics already had political institutions in place, Russia was
starting from scratch.
i. Theoretical Challenges with Influencing Federalism
Political theory suggests that idea transfer in the realm of
federalism should be an uphill battle. Due to the unique local
circumstances that must be taken into consideration, federalism is
predictably the most difficult aspect of governmental structure to
transfer from country to country.'56 Scholars explain that: "Given the
diverse circumstances of geography, history, economic condition, and
political tradition that all potential and existing federations confront,
no mechanical guide can suffice any more than we can build an
aircraft or span a river according to some fixed formula."'57 Recently,
scholars have even argued that there may be situations where
federalism is altogether impossible: "we must appreciate that there
may be ... situations in which federalism, if it exists at all, will do so
only in a form that bears the weakest correspondence to any
definition of the concept.'
5 8
Furthermore, scholars have distinguished between an ideal
symmetric federal system, in which the interests of component units
in relation to the center and each other are identical, and an ideal
asymmetric system, in which each component unit has a unique set of
features which separates its interests from the system as a whole. 9
The interests of the component units depend upon equality of
disparity in the conditions of the units which can be grouped into
environmental factors (size and location of the territory, climate,
population), social factors (ethnic origin, language, religion, history,
tradition, law, social groupings) and political factors (the political
156. Cf. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 6 (theorizing that the degree of transferability
of a given institution has an inverse relationship to its closeness to the local habitat).
157. MIKHAIL FILIPPOV ET AL., DESIGNING FEDERALISM: A THEORY OF SELF-
SUSTAINABLE FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS 299-300 (2004).
158. Id. at 331.
159. ERIC STEIN, POST COMMUNIST CONSTITUTION-MAKING: CONFESSIONS OF A
COMPARATIST 14 (European University Institute 1992).
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system).' 6°  The United States is an example of a relatively
symmetrical system in which the interests of the various states with
relation to the center are mostly identical, because they have
comparable environmental, social and political factors. Russia,
however, inherited the regional composition of the strongly
asymmetrical Soviet Union, where Russia itself was significantly
larger, more powerful, and better developed than the majority of the
other republics. Asymmetry was also created because in the Soviet
Union the ethnic republics enjoyed more autonomy than the other
republics. The existence of republics with very different ethnic and
religious populations, with different traditions, laws and political
systems, meant that this overwhelmingly asymmetrical system had a
high likelihood of dissolution by secession. According to this
categorization of federalism as either symmetric or asymmetric, the
American system was an unlikely model for the new Russian
constitution, since conditions in Russia were not appropriate for the
American symmetric federalist system.
61
In addition to the difference in the distribution of power among
the territories, Americans and Russians believe federalism has
different purposes. For Americans, federalism historically allows
separation of power along the vertical axis, designed to prevent the
excessive concentration of centralized power. For Russians,
federalism enables various peoples to live together, despite the
extreme asymmetrical conditions of society. This also suggests that
the American system would be an unlikely source for the Russians.
ii. Developing a Federalism Structure
The reality of the Russian experience with drafting their
federalism provisions both confirms and disputes the theory.
Consistent with the theoretical prediction that the American
federalism system would not be an appropriate model for the
Russians, to a large extent the Russians turned to other Western
models for guidance.62 At the same time, the Russians did borrow
aspects of the American federalist system.
The mostly American Western advisors supported
160. Id.
161. See id. at 16 (explaining "To endure, the constitution of a federal state must
take account of the underlying conditions in an appropriate way.")
162. Sharlet, supra note 2, at 64 ("Spain and Belgium have served as partial guides
for the development of the asymmetrical federalism of the Russian Federation.").
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democratically elected local governments with some genuine
authority. At the same time, they wished to secure the authority and
strength of the federal government. A strong centralized Russia
could control the nuclear remnants of the Cold War better than
decentralized republics. Similarly, a strong centralized Russia could
drive a progressive economic plan, better than small individual
republics.
As in many other aspects of designing the Russian constitutional
system, for a while it appeared that politics would play the primary
role in shaping the Russian federalist system. As the Soviet Union
fell apart, the various republics negotiated their respective powers in
a Federal Treaty. The Constitutional Commission opposed the
inclusion of the Federal Treaty the republics were demanding.
Rumyantsev justified this refusal in terms of democracy, "The
presidents of the republics are not elected democratically. If these
people sign a union treaty, it has no responsible meaning." '63 Yeltsin,
however, despite his strengthened position, needed the regions'
political support, and therefore was forced to concede and write the
constitution in such a way that they would be more likely to support
him." The republics demanded that they be identified as "sovereign
states," with the presumption that this label, combined with the terms
of the federal treaty, would protect their autonomy. Furthermore,
the republics demanded that they retain authority to bilaterally
renegotiate their relationship with Moscow, so separate deals could
be struck between regional and national governments over the
disposition of joint jurisdictions. Essentially, the republics demanded
continuation of the asymmetric system of the Soviet Union, which
treated the heavily ethnic republics differently from the
predominantly Russian jurisdictions."
In April 1993, the resolution of the conflict with the Supreme
Soviet remained unclear and Yeltsin needed the republics' political
support. Giving in to political expediency, the April 1993 presidential
draft constitution acceded to the republics' demands by adopting the
entire Federal Treaty, which called the republics sovereign, gave each
republic the right to negotiate its relationship with Moscow
bilaterally, and required that the republics' representation be
163. Notes on a Meeting with Oleg Rumyantsev, National Endowment for
Democracy (Aug. 10, 1990) (unpublished, on file with author) [hereinafter,
Rumyantsev, Meeting Notes].
164. See Tolz, supra note 10, at 2.
165. Ordeshook, supra note 155, at 52.
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increased to the extent necessary to ensure their control of the
Federation Council. Given the extreme nature of these provisions, it
came as no surprise when they were dropped in the constitution's
final version, when Yeltsin no longer needed the republics' support.'
66
Aside from political considerations, the Russians had a variety of
Western models from which to choose. The drafters of the American
constitution had no working models regarding federalism, and
therefore paid very little attention to the theoretical aspects of the
task. By contrast, post-communist nations such as Russia had
extensive Western theory and practice to scrutinize as they
determined what sort of federalism they wished to create.
a. Federal Supremacy
The first federalism issue the Russians confronted was whether
they wanted to implement federal supremacy. Rapaczynski
recommended: "at least a part of the federal Constitution should be
supreme with respect to state laws. Thus, at a minimum, in all cases
in which a conflict arises between the federal bill of rights and state
laws.., the federal bill should trump everything in state laws.' ' 168 He
believed that "in the area in which the federal government is entitled
to act.., it should be able to act decisively and directly on the people
themselves, rather than being hostage to local government approvals
or enforcement machinery." His focus on federal supremacy evokes
the American historical experience during the Articles of
Confederation, where the federal government was held hostage by
the unwillingness of the states to pay taxes or pass laws. Likely
because this balance of power was consistent with Yeltin's vision of a
strong centralized nation, this proved one of the easier problems to
solve, and as recommended, the final Russian Constitution, like its
American counterpart, makes laws that conflict with the federal
constitution null and void. The final Russian Constitution also
contains a supremacy clause indicating that when federal laws and
local laws conflict, federal laws are supreme.1
69
b. Genuine Authority for Local Government
Having chosen federal supremacy, the Russians needed to
166. Ordeshook, supra note 155, at 53.
167. STEIN, supra note 159, at Part I.
168. Supra note 87, at 5-6.
169. Monticone, supra note 132, at 9-10.
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confront its flip side, namely the provision of powers left to the local
government. For local government to have genuine authority, there
must be an area of influence left uniquely to them. This comprises
the most complex question regarding federalism: How to divide
power between the central government and the constituent states.
Horizontally, power in a field may be exclusive, concurrent, or
shared. Exclusive power means that only the local government or
only the central government may legislate within a field. Concurrent
power means that local governments are free to take action until the
central government acts, or that local governments may act unless
action by the central government serves the common purpose more
efficiently. Shared power means that the local and central
government may both take action within the same arena."'
Rapaczynski advocated a mostly exclusive power model, with
certain areas left to the exclusive dominion of the federal
government, other areas left exclusively to the constituent states, and
very little overlap of these influences. He wrote: "Federalism
properly understood is a decentralized form of government in which a
large number of decisions is left to local authorities independent from
the central government. 1 . He reinforced this idea in his response to
the Constitutional Commission's first draft by asking: "What are the
exclusive competencies of the states?
172
The Russians adopted the American approach to allocating
power to the local government. The U.S. Constitution reserves to the
states and to the people those powers neither delegated to the federal
government nor expressly denied to the states.
Scholars have noted that
The Constitution of the Russian Federation is similar to the
Constitution of the United States in that it delegates powers to the
federal government and enumerates the powers which can be
exercised concurrently by the federal government and the member
units and then states that member units may exercise powers not
mentioned in the constitution.
1 73
c. Type of Association
In addition to the division of power between the central and local
170. STEIN, supra note 159, at 52.
171. Supra note 87, at 9-10.
172. Letter from Andrzej Rapaczynski, supra note 88.
173. Monticone, supra note 132, at 8.
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governments, the Russians needed to decide "whether the Russian
Federation [was] to be a genuine state or a conglomerate of semi-
independent constituent states., 174  States can be structured as a
federation from the top down, such as Belgium and Canada, where
central authority power devolves to the component units, or as a
confederation from the bottom up, such as the United States and
Germany, where independent states accept a common constitution.
1 7
1
Rapaczynski strongly advocated for the former, writing, "the
Russian Federation should be a genuine country, rather than an
alliance."'' 76 In theory, the Soviet Union was a voluntary alliance
among autonomous republics. Rapaczynski advised that instead of
such an alliance, the Russians should have a sufficiently strong
constitutional link between the various republics that they could
compel them to act as a single country. This is consistent with the
position Americans advocated for in the Czech Republic, where
Americans pleaded for a strong federation because they believed that
only a federation could accomplish both restructuring the Belgian
economy, and integrating Belgium into the European and
international political and economic systems. 177
A subcategory of this question of the type of association is
whether and under what circumstances States ought to be allowed to
secede. This was one of the most controversial topics in the debate
over the Russian Constitution. Prior to the publication of any draft
constitutions, Rumyantsev alluded to the difficulty of the secession
question, acknowledging: "The most difficult thing is the nationalities.
They must not feel that they were forced to accept the constitution. If
they do not want to be part of the Russian Federation, the best way
out is not to ratify the constitution."'78 Based on these comments, the
assumption of the advisors working with Rumyantsev was that the
constituent States would have the right to secede.'79 Accordingly,
Rapaczynski offered the Russians specific advice regarding secession:
"If they are to be given this right, great care should be exercised to
make sure that the mode in which it can be exercised is clearly stated
174. Supra note 87, at 9.
175. STEIN, supra note 159, at 51.
176. Supra note 87, at 6.
177. See STEIN, supra note 159, at 40.
178. Rumyantsev, Meeting Notes, supra note 163.
179. See, e.g., Supra note 87, at 6 (writing "[i]n accordance with what you said in
Washington, I assume here that the constituent states ... of the Russian Federation
will have a right to opt out or secede.").
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in the Constitution itself and that the decision to step out is definitive
enough to give pause to the decider.' 80 Furthermore, he wrote:
[I]t may be possible for any particular state to secede from the
federation and go it alone. But this option must be one that allows
for a genuine separation, rather than for opting out of the particular
decisions of the federation which would open the door for an
exploitation of the other members of the federal compact.
In other words, Rapaczynski advocated thinking of secession as
an "all-or-nothing proposition: they should either remain in the
Federation and submit to its Constitution and the laws enacted in
accordance with it, or get out altogether." '82 For Rapaczynski, the
question of secession was at the very heart of whether the Russian
Federation would be an actual nation, or a loose alliance. He
encouraged the Russians to make secession a difficult proposition
because otherwise "the Russian Federation will become no more than
a loose alliance of its component parts, and the federal Constitution
will be no more than a quasi-international agreement." '183
Rapaczynski also addressed the conditions under which secession
should be permitted. He split secession into a variety of time frames.
For those nationalities who were a part of the Soviet Union, but from
the beginning did not want to join the Russian Federation, secession
made sense as "it is not advisable to keep by force the various
nationalities now composing the Russian Federation inside the future
compact to be established by the new Constitution. ''""I Beyond this,
however, he expressed concern about allowing for secession once
States decided to join the Federation: "The question to be considered
very seriously is whether the constituent states, once they make their
initial decision to enter the federal compact, should indeed be free to
step out when they no longer want to remain in it."'' 5 He reiterated
his key point that even if States can secede, it should only be from the
Federation entirely, and not from any particular piece of legislation:
Whether or not the constituent states of the Russian Federation
have a right to secede, it would be a great mistake, in my opinion,
to understand federalism as a loose association which relies on
180. Supra note 87, at 9.
181. Id. at 10.
182. Id. at 6.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 9.
185. Id.
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voluntary state compliance with the federal law. The very idea of
federalism is based on a realization that alliances are often not
enough because the parties to them have too strong incentives to
free ride on the other participants, so that some common decision
making and enforcement mechanism is necessary for the long-term
benefit of all. For this reason, the federal authority cannot rely on
voluntary compliance and must have considerable powers of its
own. As I said, it may be possible for any particular state to secede
from the federation and go it alone. But this option must be one
that allows for a genuine separation rather than for opting out of
the particular decisions of the federation which would open the
door for an exploitation of the other members of the federal
186
compact.
Despite Rumyantsev's early comments, the final version of the
Russian Constitution lacks any mention of a secession mechanism.
Although the causality is difficult to trace, this is consistent with
Rapaczynski's warnings to think very carefully about whether
secession ought to be allowed once a region had agreed to join the
federation. The Russians neither added a provision explaining the
conditions under which secession could occur, nor a provision
explicitly forbidding secession. Nevertheless, it is possible that the
shift from allowing secession in the earlier drafts to ignoring it
altogether is due to Rapaczynski's influence.
d. General Influences
In addition, to the direct influences on federalism issues
discussed above, the Russian federalism provisions were also
indirectly influenced. As already explained, Yakovlev, the head of
the working group on the Federal Organs of Power within the
Constitutional Assembly, was heavily influenced by the West.
Yakovlev was asked to present the results of his group's attempt to
subdivide the federal and regional competence, but they were unable
to draw a clear line.187 They did, however, draw on many Western
models to try to figure out some of the thornier issues. For example,
Yakovlev explained that the group drew upon both German and early
American experiences in writing the constitutional provision that
"provides that the federation council consists of two representatives
from each component of the Russian Federation, with each one
186. Supra note 87, at 9-10.
187. Supra note 37.
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appointed by the representative and executive local bodies of state
power."'8
Similarly, Leonid Smirnyagin, who also worked on the federalism
provisions, was an expert on American regional systems. He
indicated that the Russians looked at many foreign constitutions for
ideas of how to deal with the federalism problem. According to
Smirnyagin, the Russians consulted sixteen different world
constitutions, including those of Mexico, India, Germany, the United
States, and France, as they worked.189
Ultimately, the political theory suggested that the Russian
Constitution would not be influenced by the United States in the area
of federalism due to deep structural differences between the two
countries. Contrary to the predictions of political theory, the
Russians did borrow from the United States as well as other Western
countries in creating their federalism system. The various Western
influences were both direct and indirect, as the Russians searched for
a federalism model that would suit their particular needs.
C. Bill of Rights
Chapter two of the Russian Constitution is entitled "Rights and
Liberties of Man and Citizen." Placing the bill of rights as the second
chapter was no coincidence. The Russians deliberately chose this
placement to emphasize the importance of individual rights within the
Russian system: "We have deliberately placed this section on
individual freedoms ahead of the section that deals with the structure
of the state, thereby breaking with the longstanding tradition of
subservience of the individual to the mighty dragon of the state.' ' 9°
Placing the bill of rights at the front of the constitution was Russia's
unique twist to a traditional Western concept, and reflected the role
of individual rights within the Soviet system.
i. Enforceable Rights
The Western advisers and experts across the board worried that
the Russians would list too many unenforceable rights in their
constitution, thus rendering the remaining enforceable rights equally
useless. They therefore tried to convince the Russians to address this
danger. Fein noted: "The difficulty that I could conceive in the
188. LUDWIKOWSKI,supra note 73, at 63.
189. Interview with Leonid Smirnyagin, in Moscow, Russ. (July 16, 2003).
190. Rumyantsev, supra note 42, at 40.
20091
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
Russian Constitutional Draft... was that they write too many of their
rights in absolutes."' 9' Rapaczynski advised: "I have already indicated
that the Constitution should, in my view, contain only those
provisions which can, by and large, be enforced by the courts. This is
particularly important in the case of individual rights."'2 Schwartz
reiterated this concept of enforceability, telling the Russians they
have "got to be able to implement it."'93  Fein also stressed the
importance of judicial enforcement:
You should not make the constitution in my judgment a series of
campaign promises that are incapable of judicial honoring and
enforcement, because then it abuses the real important rights that
the judiciary can enforce ... [I]f you can't guarantee everyone a
nice home or whatever, then don't put it in the constitution.
19 4
Similarly, Berman wrote, "It is a defect of the Draft that it
contains too many declarations of broad goals without indication of
the means for achieving them."' 95
Ultimately, even consensus amongst the Western advisors failed
to persuade the Russians to remove all such sections. Although many
extraneous provisions were removed, for example, the section
protecting the rights of children born outside of wedlock, the Russian
Constitution still enumerates many rights that cannot be enforced by
the court system.
There are many possible explanations for the Russians' decision
to retain certain unenforceable rights. Rumyantsev did not have
enough confidence in a Constitution that would require others to fill
in the blanks. This fear may be attributed to the history of Russian
imperialism. 96 The Russians' decision can also be explained by the
difference between a legal and non-legal tradition. Fein argues that
in a country where certain rights have always been taken for granted,
they can be spoken of in generalities and do not have to be narrowly
defined. He suggests that "[C]onstitutions are best when they.. .don't
speak so much in prime colors, but put things as matters of degree
and giving weights and shape, one way or the other." Fein explains
that although the American Constitution speaks in absolutes, "we
191. Supra note 72.
192. Supra note 87.
193. Supra note 97.
194. Supra note 72.
195. Berman, supra note 94, at 3.
196. Supra note 81.
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really never have understood them in that way." For example,
although the United States has always had freedom of speech and
freedom of press "that doesn't mean that you can post where our
military is going to land in Baghdad or something."' 97 By contrast, in
a society such as Russia's where rights were never taken for granted,
it was considered important to carefully delineate all such rights9
Therefore, the Russians may have felt they were facing a very
different historical situation than their American counterparts, and
rejected the advice as inapplicable to their situation.
Alternatively, the result can be explained by the role of politics.
The authors of the draft constitution did not yet have a strong grip on
the political situation of the country. It was still feasible that the
communists could retake control, and that democracy could fail. Fein
explained that when the Russians were approached regarding cutting
extraneous provisions from the Constitution, "their basic response
was that this is a political document too."'9 9 In other words, they did
not have the luxury of writing a purely legal document, because they
did not have tight enough control over the power structure, and
therefore had to make extreme political compromises. In particular,
in the shadow of the Communist Party, they had to put in
overreaching economic provisions in order to gain the support of a
population that had lived for generations with the communist system
of economic entitlements.
ii. General Influence on Individual Rights
Despite the failure to limit the bill of rights section in the Russian
Constitution to enforceable rights, the bill of rights section was
otherwise modeled after the Anglo-American system."l Often the
language used in the Russian Constitution closely paralleled language
in the American Constitution. As Fein explained,
We wouldn't say that you have to use these exact words, but you
see that it is also useful to contemplate how once you have a
document it will be interpreted... If the language is the same as
ours in the United States then [the Russian courts] can give some
weight value to how our Supreme Court interpreted cruel and
197. Supra note 72.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Supra note 37.
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unusual punishment. That can be a useful thing.20'
For the most part, the direct influence took the form of Western
advisers reading and commenting on the bill of rights section in the
early drafts, which survived largely intact in the final version. °' In
addition, the bill of rights section was assigned to the Institute of
State of Law as their project because the Institute had previously
written a declaration of the rights of man. This assignment resulted in
indirect Western influences on the bill of rights section because the
Institute was heavily influenced by Western ideas.
The Western advisors gave specific advice on a variety of
subjects. Blaustein, one of the direct advisors to Rumyantsev, felt
that first amendment rights were critical. Rapaczynski
recommended that the bill of rights "should be guaranteed to 'every
person,' rather than to citizens alone." Only those rights should be
limited to citizens which, in some sense, pertain to the privilege of
citizenship, such as the right to vote., 2"' As advised, the bill of rights
generally are not limited to only citizens, but rather apply to the
general population by means of such phrases as "human being," "all
people," "the person," and "everyone." The few times that the
Russians used the term citizen, they combined it with the general
population, such as in Article 18 which states: "The rights and
liberties of man and citizen shall have direct effect," or Article 17
which states: "The exercise of rights and liberties of a human being
and citizen may not violate the rights and liberties of other persons."
Finally, the Russians reserved a few rights specifically to citizens. In
one such instance, Article 24, the use of the term citizen makes sense
because it deals with state provided documents, a service not usually
provided to non-citizens: "The bodies of state authority and the
bodies of local self-government and the officials thereof shall provide
to each citizen access to any documents and materials directly
affecting his/her rights and liberties unless otherwise stipulated under
the law." In addition to the few scattered references to the word
citizen, a few sections of the chapter deal with rights that pertain
exclusively to citizens and fall into the category of "the privilege of
citizenship." The privileges exclusive to citizens include the right to
201. Supra note 72.
202. Supra note 31 (claiming that well over half of the section was taken directly
from the Rumjantcev draft).
203. Supra note 31.
204. Supra note 91.
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be recognized of legal age upon reaching the age of 18, protections
against deportation or extradition, and the right to defense outside of
Russia. Other provisions limited to citizens fall into the category of
duties of the citizen, such as defense of the homeland, military or civil
service, which logically do not apply to non-citizens. Overall, the fact
that the Russians changed the bill of rights section from being entirely
limited to citizens, as was the case in the Constitutional Commission
draft, to mostly applying to the entire population shows the extent to
which they adhered to Rapaczynski's advice.
Rapaczynski also advised on the death penalty provision, which
in the early draft read: "Every individual has the right to life. No one
may be deprived of his life. The death penalty can only be imposed
by a decision of the court, with the participation of jurors, as an
exceptional measure of punishment for the most severe crimes
against an individual.""2 " First, Rapaczynski expressed a concern that
the first and second sentence seemed repetitive of each other.2 The
final constitution removed this repetitiveness, reading instead:
1. Everyone shall have the right to life.
2. Capital punishment may, until its abolition, be instituted by the
federal law as exceptional punishment for especially grave crimes
against life, with the accused having the right to have his case
considered in a law court by jury.27
Rapaczynski also noted that the third sentence of the early draft
was "at least superficially, in contradiction with the first two." 208 His
concern was that the same section states that no one may be deprived
of his life, and then immediately afterwards explains precisely how
someone can be deprived of their life, without wording this
deprivation as an exception to the general rule. The final draft did
not completely resolve this issue, although the removal of the second
sentence caused a slightly less harsh juxtaposition. It is still less clear
than the American Constitution, which as Rapaczynski points out
''simply states that 'No person shall be deprived of life ... without
due process of law.
'
'
219
Rapaczynski also commented on a provision of the early draft
205. Draft Constitution, supra note 74, at art. 2.3.1.
206. Supra note 91.
207. Konst. RF, supra note 116.
208. Supra note 91.
209. Id.
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constitution which stated, "All citizens have the right to receive the
opportunity to earn an income through the kind of labor which they
freely choose and to which they freely agree ... ,,210 Rapaczynski
expressed his concern that "the language of the beginning phrase may
come to be interpreted as obliging the state to provide work to every
person (which, by the way, seems contradicted by the provision for
unemployment compensation at the end of the same point)." To
solve this problem, he proposed "different language the subject of
which is not 'every person' (or even 'every citizen'), but rather the
state. E.g. The state protects labor., 211  The final draft of the
Constitution changes the language of the original, but does not make
the subject the State. Instead, the new language states, "Work shall
be free. Everyone shall have the right to make free use of his or her
abilities for work and to choose a type of activity and occupation."2 '2
The first phrase of the new language addresses Rapaczynski's concern
by having the subject be the work itself. This phrase translates
awkwardly into English, because of the double meaning for the word
free, but the presumed meaning here is that work is free, as in
accessible or unlimited, not that it does not cost anything. Therefore,
by beginning the section with this generic subject-less statement, the
Russians tried to achieve the effect that Rapaczynski had suggested.
Article 2.4.9 in the original draft constitution was a topic of
concern for both Rapaczynski and Judge Williams. The article read:
"A working person has the right to remuneration which is consistent
with the quantity and quality of his labor and adequate to ensure a
dignified existence. The remuneration paid to a working person for
his labor may not be less than the subsistence wage in his area.,
213
Williams underlined large sections of the article, circled the word
"and," and, in the margin jotted down, "Who decides? State? Private
negotiation?" Thus, Judge Williams inquired as to who determines
the wages, an important point given the socialist tradition of the
former Soviet Union. He also noted in the margin that perhaps the
wage should depend on "the willingness of another to pay that
remuneration., 21 4 This original provision is clearly heavily influenced
by the Soviet socialist tradition, whereas the American advisors came
210. Draft Constitution, supra note 74, at art. 2.4.8.
211. Supra note 91.
212. Konst. RF, supra note 116, art. 37.
213. Draft Constitution, supra note 74.
214. Williams, Text Comments, supra note 115.
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from a strong capitalistic tradition. Rapaczynski alludes to this
difference in his memorandum:
Given the possibility of employment with private employers, with
the wages determined by the market, I do not think that the state
should be obliged to assure equal pay for equal work by every
employer ... It seems that all that can be expected is that the state
pass laws protecting employees against discrimination on the basis
• • 215
of some specified categories.
The final version of the Russian Constitution takes into account
these concerns by moderating the language. "Everyone shall have
the right to work under conditions meeting the requirements of safety
and hygiene, to remuneration for work without any discrimination
whatsoever and not below the statutory minimum wage .,,26 This
incorporates Rapaczynski's suggestion to include the language that
individuals should be protected against "discrimination." However,
the revised version does not enumerate specific types of
discrimination, as Rapaczynski suggested. Also, unlike the original
article, which talked about wages in highly abstract terms, the final
draft uses more practical language. This answers Judge Williams's
question by implying that the State decides the amount of money
considered adequate to ensure a dignified existence.
Article 2.4.15 of the draft constitution included a statement that
restricts the rights and freedoms of the citizens of the Russian
Federation under certain scenarios including when the exercise of
these rights are "encouraging religious, social, or national intolerance,
or war propaganda. 2 17 Rapaczynski took exception to this clause,
writing, "I do not believe that the state should be given any right to
forbid the enjoyment of rights which 'incites' to class or 'social'
hatred., 218 He also opposed banning war propaganda. 29 This section
was moved from its original location in the document, to the section
immediately following the statement regarding the right to freedom
of speech and thought. The new line reads, "Propaganda or
campaigning inciting social, racial, national or religious hatred and
strife is impermissible. The propaganda of social, racial, national,
215. Supra note 91.
216. Konst. RF, supra note 116.
217. Draft Constitution, supra note 74.
218. Supra note 91.
219. Id.
20091
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
religious or language superiority is forbidden."'20 Therefore, the use
of the term "war propaganda" was removed as suggested, although
the restriction on religious, social or nationally intolerant speech
remained.
Finally, some of the influences on the section on individual rights
were indirect, and resulted from the Russians' familiarity with
corresponding provisions in the American or other Western systems.
This occurred most obviously in the section on criminal rights where
the Russians borrowed such familiar concepts as double jeopardy,
and the protection against self-incrimination. Yakovlev confirms that
the American experience was important to Russian developments in
freedom of speech, freedom from unlawful detention, jury trials, and
the right to counsel.22' In the case of the jury trial, "the constitutional
right to a jury trial, and its enabling legislation, draws directly on the
Russian pre-Revolutionary jury, which in turn was the result of the
reception of Western norms in the mid-nineteenth century.,
222
Whether as the result of direct advice by Western experts, or Russian
scholars borrowing from familiar norms, it is clear for the bill of rights
section of the Russian Constitution "a lot of the phrasing are just
things that are straight out of [the American] constitution., 223
IV. Conclusion
The Russians undeniably were influenced by the West in writing
the 1993 Russian Constitution. Domestic politics often explains
which Western model the Russians selected, or why they occasionally
rejected Western models altogether. Yeltsin's control over the
political situation meant that Russia would choose a strong
presidential republic. Politics may also explain why the Russians
were more likely to adopt a particular Western suggestion when it
coincided with what was politically preferred, and less likely to do so
when it directly contradicted a political decision.
The Russian case study demonstrates that constitutional
influence need not come from the donor country's government.
Although George H. W. Bush and his administration did not actively
promote constitutional reform in Russia, other Western leaders still
worked successfully to influence constitutional change. Most of the
220. Konst. RF, supra note 116, art. 29, § 2.
221. YAKOVLEV,supra note 51, at xv.
222. Sharlet, supra note 2, at 64.
223. Supra note 72.
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influence came not from government officials, or specific
organizations, but rather from individual advisors.24
The Russian example also suggests that Western influences are
particularly effective when a provision is disputed. When there is
already disagreement over how som9thing is to be done, then the
Western norm can be a powerful authority to sway the balance. Both
aspects of the impeachment example demonstrate the increased
power of Western influences when a particular provision is disputed.
This case study also illustrates that a country's history can affect
the extent of Western influence. For example, although Western
advisors cautioned the Russians against too long a constitution, due
to a history of overbearing governments, Rumyantsev lacked the
confidence that others would fill in the blanks. Similarly, due to their
history as a society where rights could never be taken for granted, the
Russians prioritized careful delineation of all such rights.
Certain aspects of the Russian experience also support the
prediction of some political theorists that argue that changes in legal
systems result from borrowing.2 25  For example, in choosing a
presidential model, Western influence occurred because key Russian
actors were familiar with the French system, admired it, felt it was
applicable to the Russian situation, and borrowed from it. Indirect
influences were important in Russia in all areas of the constitution,
and in many cases worked in cooperation with direct influences,
laying the seeds of thought on which an advisor could then build.
This observation may present a challenge for Western attempts
to influence constitution writing in countries such as Afghanistan or
Iraq where fewer key actors may have been educated in Western
constitutional models. In these situations, more human capital
development may be necessary to educate the key players on the
Western models, to enable them to wisely choose the model that
makes sense for their situation.
From the perspective of the donor nation, the Russian example is
also consistent with theories regarding the conditions under which a
224. Cf BILLINGTON, supra note 2, at 100 (arguing that the transfer of ideas in
Russia does not occur at the state level, but rather occurs in day to day interactions
between individuals).
225. See generally ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO
COMPARATIVE LAW (1974) (arguing that most changes in most legal systems are the
result of borrowing); Gianmaria Ajani, By Chance and Prestige: Legal Transplants in
Russia and Eastern Europe, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 93 (1995) (arguing that legal
transplants historically result from initiatives taken by the recipient legal system).
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donor state attempts to influence the domestic institutions of another
country. For example, John Owen theorizes that target states are
generally countries with internal instability, and of strategic
importance to the influencing country.226 This is the case with the
United States and Russia, as undoubtedly Russia in the early 1990s
could be categorized as a country with internal instability.
Furthermore, Russia was strategically important to the United States,
economically, politically, and in terms of security. Although
consistent with Owen's theory, this conclusion makes less sense in a
context such as this one where the influence on the part of the U.S.
was less the product of a coordinated effort, than the random albeit
influential advice of various individuals.
Rett Ludwikowski theorizes that Western influence on foreign
constitutions is less likely where countries are trying to distinguish
their social orientation from the West. 227 This is consistent with the
Russian experience, as the Russians were not trying to distinguish
their social orientation from the West. Ludwikowski's theory also
raises the issue of the international relations conditions necessary for
the successful transfer of political institutions. The influences on the
Russian Constitution occurred in a unique time in history when the
Russians were eager to assimilate the West. Furthermore, the
Russians faced a unique moment, in which there were no ideas to
challenge democracy. A decade later, given the relationship between
the United States and the world, a similar transfer of ideas would be
significantly less likely.
Constitutional assistance, like democracy assistance more
generally, is often criticized on the grounds that constitutional
advisers are overly infatuated with their home country's system.228
The Russian example questions this criticism. Not only did the
Western advisors claim to be considering Russia's unique interests,
but their attempts to do so are apparent in the content of the advice
given. For example, Blaustein did not emphasize the U.S.
Constitution, realizing that the Russians would be sensitive to such an
approach. Instead, he felt that his role was to educate on Western
notions of constitutionalism, not the American constitution itself.
226. Owen, supra note 4, at 375.
227. LUDWIKOWSKI,supra note 73, at 67.
228. See CAROTHERS, supra note 5, at 97-98 (criticizing both U.S. and foreign
democracy promoters for basing their democracy programs on their own national
model, and being "strikingly unaware of the variety of political structures in other
established democracies.").
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This is also seen in the Western efforts to influence the Russian
presidency. If this critique were correct, then American advisors
should have pushed the American presidential model. The evidence
shows that the advisors did not promote the American presidential
model at all, but rather considered the conditions in place, presented
the various models available, and left it to the Russians to decide.
Similarly, although the American experts felt it was important
for the Russians to have judicial review, none of the key experts
claimed that judicial review had to be done exactly like the United
States. In fact, the efforts of some American lawyers to try to push
the Supreme Court model was met with scorn on the part of the more
influential advisors, who understood the fallacy of this attempt. The
main Western advisors did not push the American system, but rather
their justifications for pushing a judicial review system clearly evoked
the unique Russian experience with the Soviet system, and not some
higher notion of judicial review as necessary for all countries.
Overall, the experience of the West in influencing the 1993
Russian Constitution confirms many of the theories regarding the
conditions necessary to transfer institutions from one country to
another, and contradicts others. While a single case study is
insufficient to develop an entire theory, the conclusions that can be
drawn from a study of the writing of the Russian Constitution should
be carefully noted by Western advisors who continue to work to
influence the constitutions of other countries.
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